” I think BAOR is a very not helpful example of how to organise an army in that it was a garrison based force, designed to die in place, in a nuclear war in two to four weeks fighting.”
Wilf Owen
In February 1968, at the height of the Cold War, General Sir John Hackett (above) then Commander of the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) wrote a long letter to The Times to explain NATO’s true purpose. More than half a century later, his analysis is relevant to the challenges Europe faces in 2025. Hackett commanded the front line of NATO’s Central Region, with Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces massed just across the inner German border (IGB). He had fought in the second world war so when he wrote about readiness, deterrence and political will, he did so from direct operational experience. The message he delivered in 1968 could be republished today with barely a sentence changed.
In 1978 Hackett reinforced his concerns when he published his book, written with six others, “The Third World War: August 1985” Hackett blended political analysis with battlefield detail to imagine a NATO–Warsaw Pact conflict fought across Europe in the mid 1980s. It was a must read for Cold War soldiers and civilians alike and popularised a genre later captilised on by other authors like Tom Clancy and his thriller “Red Storm Rising”.
Happily for Western readers the war ends with NATO victorious and the collapse of the Soviet Union. That said we need to be careful not to view the British Army Of The Rhine (BAOR) through rose tinted glasses as Wilf Owen, a recent guest on the podcast, pointed out, ” I think BAOR is a very not helpful example of how to organise an army in that it was a garrison based force, designed to die in place, in a nuclear war in two to four weeks fighting. And the idea was to basically hold the Russians long enough for diplomacy to to break out”. You can listen to that podcast here:
Hackett’s Letter
DEFINING THE TRUE PURPOSE OF NATO: WHAT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD
From General Sir John Hackett, Commander, Northern Army Group
Sir,—The true purpose of Nato does not always seem to be perfectly understood, either by its members, its friends and perhaps, therefore, even more, its critics and its potential enemies. If you would be so obliging, therefore, I should like to take the hospitality of your columns to set out some of the more important matters as I see them.
I write as the Commander of the Northern Army Group, one of the two main Nato Army Groups, and also as the Central Region’s Allied Commander in Northern Europe. My area of command covers a somewhat broader sphere than merely Belgium, a Belgian Channel, and the British Army of the Rhine. I have had this enlarged responsibility for almost two years.
In the view of this situation my comments are based on personal experience on the most vital part of the central front of Europe. I am glad to find that you have given some prominence recently to a number of questions which have an important bearing on the defence of Europe. You are right, I think, to suggest that the real threat to the stability of the Alliance comes not from our enemies but from ourselves. You rightly call attention to the real weaknesses in the existing Nato structure which derive mainly from political divergences between the member nations. It is, indeed, true that Nato is primarily a political organisation. But unless it is supported by an adequate military capability it cannot achieve its political aim.
What then is Nato’s political aim? The treaty makes this absolutely clear. It is the preservation of peace. What lies behind the treaty is the recognition that peace is not served by weakness. Nothing is more certain to invite the adventurous intervention of others — or even their active hostility — than the spectacle of weakness among one’s friends. If Nato is to maintain the peace and preserve the independence of its member nations it requires a military force in being which can be relied on, and which is seen by potential aggressors from outside the Alliance to be fully ready and somewhat unhesitatingly prepared to take action against any threat of aggression from whatever quarter it may arise.
These forces exist in being, are maintained, trained and equipped, for this purpose. Their role is to fight. For a long time the strongest guarantee of Nato’s credibility was the concept of “massive retaliation”, by which it was hoped that nuclear weapons would deter aggression and remove the need for large conventional forces. That concept is no longer valid in its original form, but it still has force. The credibility of the Alliance, however, now rests primarily on the absolute determination of the Nato governments to defend its members against any aggression, of whatever kind; and on the efficiency and readiness of Nato forces in being to undertake whatever operations they may be called upon to carry out.
The Nato forces of the Europe line build the visible front line of the Alliance, and are deployed on the borders of the Nato nations. In the Central Region in particular the forces of the Northern Army Group and of the Central Army Group stand in position on the borders of Germany, directly confronting the massive military potential of the Warsaw Pact. That potential is formidable and could be used to create a situation in the West intolerable for any free nation to endure.
Although it is true that our potential enemies are “hard up” in some respects, life is much easier for them in others. Their expenditure on defence does cause hardship; but it is not easy to believe that the citizen of East Germany or of most other Warsaw Pact countries would be any worse off if some of the resources now used for military preparations were diverted for other purposes. In the U.S.S.R. one sees in the armed forces a great proportion of the more able of the young men, in many cases far better nourished and cared for than their brothers in civilian life. It is a curious aspect of the Communist system that it is able to create forces of such magnitude and readiness.
This is something which should not be underestimated or ignored in the West. Forces of this size exist only because they are thought to be necessary. They are available and ready for use. They constitute the greatest single threat to the peace of the world.
Nato, then, is, in a sense, a military reflexion of the political will to preserve the independence and freedom of its member nations. Labour, capital, management and government in our countries have all contributed to the creation of military forces designed to support that will. The contribution made by Britain in the Northern Army Group in the defence of Europe is of the utmost importance to the Alliance.
These forces are an essential part of the British Army’s purpose. They form our major contribution to the defence of Europe. They are deployed in Germany not as a gesture of goodwill, nor in fulfilment of a treaty obligation only, but because they have a vital military role to play. The credibility of our contribution rests on the strength and efficiency of the troops we deploy. The forces we have in Germany today are probably as good as we have ever had. They are well trained, well equipped and well led. The quality of the soldiers is extremely high; the standard of their training and discipline equals anything I have seen in my long military experience.
Nevertheless we still fall short in some respects. We are short of sufficient men and inevitably in some areas of equipment. Where the existing balance allows it we make do with substitutes. In some cases they are not very satisfactory. It is quite evident, however, that these deficiencies require urgent attention. The potential threat is so great, and its implications so terrifying, that nothing less than the best is good enough. This is why we in the Northern Army Group have emphasised the requirement for increased mobility in the forces and continued improvement in the quality and availability of equipment, both conventional and nuclear, to maintain a capability to deal with any level of conflict.
Nato is, in fact, a fully reflexive, operational alliance committed to defence. It is built on the moral and political determination of the member nations to maintain their freedom and independence. We can do it only if we remain strong and vigilant. The threat to the peace is real; the reality of that threat must be recognised.
I apologise for having written at such length, but these things seem to me of the utmost importance, and I am grateful to you, Sir, for the opportunity of expressing these views.
I am, etc.,
JOHN HACKETT,
Headquarters, Northern Army Group.
408 Moncade-Obbendorf, Rhineland.
“The Real Threat To NATO Comes Not From Our Enemies But From Ourselves“
Hackett warned that political divergence inside NATO was the greatest strategic danger. He understood that alliances collapse from within long before they are beaten from without.
2025 reality:
- NATO is divided over support for Ukraine, defence spending, and long-term US commitment.
- European governments struggle to align threat perceptions and procurement priorities.
- Public opinion inside member states is inconsistent, complacent, and often politically fragmented.
Hackett’s warning about internal weakness remains painfully accurate.
“Peace Is Not Served By Weakness”
In 1968, the credibility of NATO depended on its ability to demonstrate strength. Not rhetorically, but through forward-deployed, combat-ready forces.
2025 reality:
- NATO stockpiles are depleted by Ukraine.
- Air defence across Europe remains dangerously thin.
- Many nations cannot generate a single fully equipped brigade at short notice.
- Britain’s army is at its smallest in centuries.
Deterrence still works but only when backed by visible military power.
Hackett’s Assessment Applies Directly To Russia Today
He emphasised that the Warsaw Pact maintained huge, ready forces because it believed them necessary and that the West should not underestimate this.
2025 reality:
- Russia has shifted to a war economy.
- Artillery and missile production outpace Western industry.
- Mobilisation capacity remains far larger than Europe’s.
- Russian leaders have demonstrated a willingness to absorb extreme casualties to achieve political ends.
Hackett understood the psychology of authoritarian adversaries: they will exploit any perceived weakness.
“Our Forces Are High Quality But Lack Numbers, Equipment And Reserves“
Hackett praised the professionalism of British soldiers but warned about shortages in manpower and kit.
2025 reality: This is arguably worse today than in 1968:
- Recruiting struggles are acute across NATO.
- Ammunition stockpiles would last days, not weeks.
- European industry cannot surge quickly enough for high-intensity warfare.
- The UK’s ability to sustain a brigade-level fight is openly questioned in Parliament.
The imbalance between quality and quantity , a recurring British problem has never been more stark. Hackett’s closing line reads like a message addressed directly to modern European electorates. He believed the biggest danger was complacency.
2025 reality: Despite the largest land war in Europe since 1945, many governments still assume crisis can be managed away. Hackett would have argued the opposite: deterrence relies on readiness, not hope.
Conclusion
Hackett’s 1968 letter is an interesting window to the past that is still relevant today. Specifically:
- NATO unity is fragile
- Military readiness is inconsistent
- The adversary is determined and rebuilding
- The public is complacent
- Peace requires credible force
It is also an anomaly that 500 million Europeans look to 350 million Americans for their security and expect them to pick up the tab despite having an economy twelve times that of Russia with a population of 140 million. Equally strange that, under these circumstances, Putin can set the terms for any discussion knowing the threat of nuclear weapons will silence our timid politicians. Hackett understood that politics plus military capability equals deterrence. In 1968, his words were a caution but in 2025 they read like a diagnosis for a patient with a terminal disease.
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